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1.  Introduction 
 
Theory suggests that whether and to what extent an economy prices information asymmetry 
amongst traders depends on the level of competition for firms’ shares (Kyle, 1989; Lambert et 
al., 2012). Competition, however, is an abstract concept and measuring it is fraught with 
controversy. The theoretical literature characterizes competition in the context of risk-bearing 
capacity – in effect, the total number of investors in the economy. The idea is that as the number 
of investors in the economy grows, the greater the economy’s capacity to bear risk, and the 
more competition for firms’ shares.  In the extreme, as risk-bearing capacity becomes very 
large, an economy approaches perfect competition. 1 In the presence of perfect competition, 
information asymmetry has no separate effect on cost of capital after controlling for the average 
precision of information. In contrast, in an economy where competition is imperfect, 
information asymmetry has a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. However, as the number 
of investors who participate in the economy grows, the economy’s risk-bearing capacity 
increases – thereby pushing it closer to perfect competition. In conjunction with this, 
information asymmetry commands a smaller price discount.  
Acknowledging that measuring competition is complex, Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins 
et al. (2011) in pioneering studies provide important, initial evidence on the effect of 
competition on the pricing of information asymmetry by employing the number of investors 
holding a firm’s shares as a measure of competition for that firm’s shares. While this approach 
is novel, it raises significant interpretational challenges because of its departure from the 
theoretical notion of risk-bearing capacity, where risk-bearing capacity measures the 
economy’s potential for share competition irrespective of the number of shareholders for a firm 
                                                          
1 Perfect competition refers to the notion that investors act as price takers and thus can buy or sell any quantity at 
the market price. Such a characterization implicitly assumes that the number of investors in the economy is very 
large (countably infinite): see, e.g., Hellwig (1980) 
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at a particular time.2 Thus, we believe it is important to re-visit whether and to what extent an 
economy prices information asymmetry based on its risk-bearing capacity, a construct closer 
in spirit to the theoretical literature. This study aims to fill this gap by using equity market 
liberalization of emerging market countries as shocks to the risk bearing capacity of these 
countries.  
We believe this is an important research undertaking given the significance of this question 
and the current state of the literature. Information asymmetry amongst traders has long been a 
concern of securities regulators across the globe, with the introduction of many policy 
initiatives designed to curb this problem. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enacted Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 to prevent firms from making 
selective disclosures to investors and analysts. While such initiatives implicitly assume that the 
costs associated with information asymmetry are large, most recent studies find that asymmetry 
is not priced on average (Duarte and Young, 2009; Lai et al., 2014; Mohanram and Rajgopal, 
2009). The insight originating with Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins et al. (2011) is to search 
for evidence of pricing of information asymmetry conditional on the level of competition. We 
follow-up on this suggestion, but in a fashion that uses risk-bearing capacity to measure 
competition. The two-fold advantage of our approach is that it positions us closer to the extant 
theoretical literature and resolves the interpretational challenges associated with using firm-
level shareholding patterns to measure competition.3 
                                                          
2 The issue is that this approach implicitly assumes that investors who choose not to hold a stock do not contribute 
to the overall risk-bearing capacity. However, the mere expectation that these investors might purchase shares if 
the price of risk falls sufficiently low allows these investors to affect share prices without necessarily holding the 
stock. That is, it is not necessarily clear that a firm held by, say, 30 investors, has greater risk-bearing capacity 
than a firm held by 20 investors. The issue of measuring competition becomes even more fraught when one 
considers that a firm’s shareholders are the outcome of endogenous ownership decisions made by shareholders 
based on investee firm characteristics: there is the possibility that these firm characteristics could explain the 
observed association between the number of shareholders and the extent to which information asymmetry is 
priced. For example, it could be that riskier and difficult to understand opaque firms are owned by a few 
sophisticated blockholders, while less risky and more transparent firms are owned by a larger number of less 
sophisticated retail investors. These interpretational challenges make it difficult to associate competition at the 
firm-level with whether information asymmetry is priced. 
3 With regard to the latter, see the discussion in the previous footnote. 
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Equity market liberalization is a governmental decision to permit foreign ownership of 
stocks. Therefore, liberalizations essentially represent shocks to country-level risk-bearing 
capacity and provide a natural setting to study our research question. We identify key 
liberalization events for our sample of 23 emerging market countries by focusing on large 
jumps in a time-varying measure of regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership that has been 
widely employed in prior work.4 Our sample covers 13 liberalization shocks experienced in 
these countries between 1996 and 2006. We adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
methodology to compare the change in the price of information asymmetry for firms in 
countries that experience liberalization shocks (treatment countries) to the contemporaneous 
change for firms in countries that experience no such shocks (control countries). We use bid-
ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry and compare the cost of capital of firms with 
high bid-ask spreads to firms with low bid-ask spreads to measure the effect of information 
asymmetry on price. In effect, our DiD design examines changes in the mapping between bid-
ask spreads and cost of capital around liberalization shocks for treatment countries relative to 
control countries. 
We measure a firm’s cost of capital using an implied cost of capital approach wherein 
we calculate cost of capital as the discount rate that equates the firm’s stock price to the present 
value of all expected cash flows. As we discuss in detail in Subsection 3.1, use of implied cost 
of capital (as opposed to stock returns or dividend yields) allows us to address the confounding 
effect of growth opportunities; this is particularly problematic in a liberalization setting.5 The 
implied cost of capital approach provides ex ante estimates at a point in time. This allows us to 
examine cost of capital changes around relatively narrow liberalization-shock windows, 
                                                          
4 The measure was developed in Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003). Examples of other studies that 
use some variant of this measure include Bae et al. (2004), Bae et al. (2012), Bekaert et al. (2007), De Jong and 
De Roon (2005), and Mitton (2006). 
5 As noted in Henry (2000), policy makers are likely to liberalize when their countries experience expansion in 
growth opportunities. Second, the liberalization event itself is likely to trigger economic growth. 
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thereby minimizing concerns about the effect of growth and other confounding events. In 
addition, this approach enables us to adjust explicitly for forward expectations of growth using 
analyst forecasts, and, hence, distinguish better between the cost of capital and growth effects 
(Hail and Leuz, 2009).  
We find that the price discount associated with having higher bid-ask spreads declines 
significantly following liberalization shocks for firms in treatment countries compared to 
contemporaneous changes in the price discount for firms in control countries. Our estimates 
imply that following a large liberalization shock, the price discount associated with an increase 
in bid-ask spreads equivalent to the interquartile range (i.e., increase from the bottom to the top 
quartile) decreases by about 37 basis points. In support of the parallel trends assumption 
underlying our DiD design, we find no evidence of this decline in the periods prior to the 
liberalization shocks. We also find no evidence of such a decline in placebo tests that exploit 
liberalization of four financial markets other than equity markets: money markets, bond 
markets, derivative markets, and government securities markets. This suggests that any 
changes in countries’ growth prospects or other reforms that tend to accompany a general 
opening up of financial markets are unlikely to drive our main results. In further support of our 
story, we find that the decline in the price of information asymmetry manifests primarily for 
firms that do not already have access to foreign capital through American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs). Overall, the results suggest that allowing foreign investors to participate in an 
economy attenuates the impact of information asymmetry on stock prices. 
Finally, we exploit the international nature of our setting to conduct an exploratory 
analysis of how the quality of home-country institutions and governance infrastructure affects 
the benefits of liberalizations on the price of information asymmetry. Poor institutional 
infrastructure and corporate governance typically thwarts local investors from participating in 
equity markets, thus countries with poor institutions are more likely to approximate imperfect 
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market settings prior to liberalization. Consequently, such countries are more likely to benefit 
from reductions in the price of information asymmetry resulting from foreign investor 
participation. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the decline in the price of 
information asymmetry associated with an increase in risk-bearing capacity is concentrated 
among countries that have low levels of securities regulation and insider trading enforcement.  
2. Background on Liberalization and its Measurement 
2.1. The multistage nature of liberalization and its measurement 
Most emerging market countries initiated the official equity market liberalization process 
in late 1980s or early 1990s. Liberalization, however, is a multi-step undertaking and this initial 
liberalization for most countries represents only the first step in the overall liberalization (e.g., 
Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Edison and Warnock, 2003). For example, Korea initiated the 
liberalization process in 1992 by allowing foreign investors to own up to 10% of domestic 
equity, but a significant part of the liberalization occurred in late 1990s when Korea increased 
the foreign ownership limit to 55% by 1997; Ownership restrictions were completely 
eliminated by 1998 in all but a few regulated sectors.  
Because of the data requirements for measuring the cost of capital (detailed later) and for 
the availability of bid-ask spreads, our sample is constrained to begin from 1996, which falls 
after the initial liberalization dates for our sample countries. As explained above, however, this 
is not problematic as we are able to exploit the rich cross-sectional and time series variation in 
the liberalization subsequent to the initial liberalization. We identify the liberalization shocks 
during our sample period by examining jumps in a measure of regulatory restrictions on foreign 
ownership that has been widely employed in prior work and constructed based on information 
provided by the Standard and Poor’s/International Finance Corporation (SP/IFC).6 We obtain 
                                                          
6 In the Internet Appendix, we present the robustness of our results to two other measures of regulatory restrictions 
on foreign ownership that have been used in prior work: the Chinn-Ito index and the Schindler (2009) measure, 
both of which are based on information in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). A significant drawback of these measures is that they 
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data on this measure from Edison and Warnock (2003), who provide a monthly time series of 
this measure until the end of 2006. 7  
The methodology for the construction of this measure is as follows. SP/IFC, for each 
emerging market country, computes two indices: a global index (IFCG), designed to represent 
the market value of equity in a country, and an investable index (IFCI), designed to represent 
the subset of the market value of equity in a country that is available to foreign investors. To 
compute the investable index, SP/IFC first determines the openness of each stock to foreign 
ownership at the market level by examining country-level restrictions on foreign stock 
ownership. Next, they determine the extent of industry, corporate by-law, and corporate charter 
limitations on foreign ownership. Based on the market-wide limits, and industry and firm-
specific limitations, an openness (or investability) factor for each stock is determined, which 
equals the fraction of stock available to foreign investors. This information at the stock level is 
then aggregated to determine the investible index (IFCI) at the country level, which when 
scaled by the global index (IFCG) provides a country-level measure of the fraction of equity 
available for foreign investment. Specifically, one can measure the extent of a country’s 
liberalization as:  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
,                 (1) 
where MC is the market capitalization at time t of country i’s IFCI or IFCG index.  
The above liberalization measure closely tracks actual changes in regulatory restrictions 
on foreign ownership. As an example, for Korea the measure increases from 0% in 1991 to 
9.5% in 1992, 54.5% by 1997, and 91.2% by 1998. This maps closely into the actual regulatory 
                                                          
consider equity market liberalization to be an “all-or-nothing” variable and thus do not capture much of the 
variation in liberalization rules captured by our measure. Despite this issue, we find that our inferences are 
generally robust to use of these measures. 
7 SP/IFC discontinued this data collection after 2006. Data on investability can be downloaded from Frank 
Warnock’s website at: http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/warnockf/research.htm.  
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restrictions which forbade any foreign ownership until 1991, allowed 10% ownership by 1992, 
55% by 1997, and 100% by 1998, except for some regulated sectors such as 
telecommunications, air transportations, and broadcasting. The measure is somewhat lower 
than the actual regulatory limits because of exceptions for some regulated sectors, which either 
had lower limits or were completely closed to foreign investors. 
One issue with this ratio is that because ownership restrictions vary across sectors, 
asymmetric shocks to investable and non-investable stocks will lead to relative price changes, 
causing changes in the ratio of the market capitalizations that are unrelated to restrictions on 
foreign ownership. To circumvent this issue, Edison and Warnock (2003) also provide an 
adjusted liberalization measure that approximately removes the effect of asymmetric price 
shocks by scaling the measure with the relative prices of investable and non-investable stocks 
in the following way: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
�
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
�
 ,                        (2) 
where P denotes the price indices. Edison and Warnock (2003) find that the adjusted measure 
exhibits smoother variation over time and more closely tracks changes in regulatory 
restrictions on foreign ownership.  
 We identify liberalization shocks for our sample countries based on jumps in this 
liberalization measure.8 Table 1 presents the descriptives for this measure for our sample 
ranging from 1996 to 2006. For comparison, we also provide the estimated initial liberalization 
dates from Bekeart and Harvey (2000) and Mitton (2006). 9 First, for all the countries except 
                                                          
8 We also considered using reverse liberalization shocks (i.e., increases in restrictions on foreign ownership) to 
test our hypothesis. We are, however, unable to find any economically meaningful reverse liberalization shocks 
because most emerging market countries have trended toward increasing liberalization during our sample 
period. Any reverse liberalization shocks that exist are either economically too small or represent only a 
temporary reversal for a very short-time period.  
9 As Henry (2000, Table II) shows, there is no consensus on the official liberalization date. 
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South Africa [as per dates outlined in Bekaert and Harvey (2000)] and Israel [as per Mitton 
(2006)], the official/initial liberalization dates fall well before 1996, the beginning of our 
sample period. Second, there is considerable time series and cross-sectional variation in the 
measure that we use to identify changes to liberalization that are staggered across countries 
over time. To further illustrate this point, in Figure 1 we plot the liberalization measures for 
two of our sample countries: Brazil and Korea. In each case, the (first) major regulatory reform 
is indeed associated with a significant increase in this measure, but the measure continues to 
change. For instance, foreign access to the Korean equity market increased significantly in 
1997 and 1998, which results in large jumps in the liberalization measure. 
 A potential concern is that removal of explicit regulatory barriers to foreign ownership 
may not result in increased competition for firms’ shares if foreign investors continue to face 
significant implicit barriers due to poor local institutional infrastructure. For example, foreign 
investors may not be willing to invest in stocks in emerging markets if they are concerned about 
poor investor protection and governance in these countries. Prior studies, however, provide 
strong evidence that removal of regulatory barriers is associated with a significant increase in 
foreign capital flows, market valuations, investments, and growth.10 It would be difficult to 
explain these findings if the liberalization shocks did not result in a significant increase in the 
risk-bearing capacity from foreign investors. Although data constraints on foreign ownership 
significantly limit us, in the Internet Appendix we also provide evidence that removal of 
regulatory barriers is associated with increased investment from foreign institutional investors. 
2.2. Identifying liberalization shocks 
We identify liberalization events for our sample countries based on economically large 
changes to the LIBERALIZATION measure during our 1996-2006 sample period. Specifically, 
                                                          
10  See, for example, Bae et al., 2004; Bae and Goyal, 2010; Bekaert, 1995; De Jong and De Roon, 2005; Edison 
and Warnock, 2003; Henry, 2000; Mitton, 2006. 
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we classify the changes to the LIBERALIZATION measure as “large” if they fall in the top 
tercile of the distribution of all country-year changes in the continuous measure. We later 
document that our findings are robust to several alternative definitions of liberalization shocks. 
In Table 1, we list the years of the first top-tercile liberalization shocks for our sample countries. 
We find that 13 countries experience a top-tercile liberalization shock, which on average 
(median) represents a 15% (14%) increase in the regulatory limit on foreign ownership.  
We focus on large shocks to liberalization for two reasons. First, by design the Edison 
and Warnock (2003) measure only approximately captures the restrictions on foreign 
ownership; the measure also exhibits minor variations even without changes in liberalization 
rules due to asymmetric price shocks to the numerator and denominator. For example, Korea 
had a 10% limit on ownership by foreign investors from 1992 to 1994. During this period, the 
monthly time series of the Edison and Warnock measure varies from 9.4% to 11%. Therefore, 
while the measure closely tracks the actual limit of 10%, if we used the continuous changes in 
the measure, we would classify even minor changes resulting from asymmetric price shocks as 
liberalization events, significantly reducing the power of our tests. 
Second, focusing on large changes allows us to construct our analyses around 
economically significant liberalization events. For example, the liberalization shock dummy 
for Korea takes the value of 1 for 1997. This was widely viewed as the year in which Korea 
for the first time indicated its strong commitment to liberalization by increasing the limit on 
foreign ownership from 20% to 55%. All prior liberalization steps taken by Korea during our 
sample period (i.e., 1996 onwards) are small and represent no more than 3% increase in foreign 
ownership limit. Focusing on such key liberalization events is likely to be important because, 
as argued in Edison and Warnock (2008), foreign investors may hesitate to provide capital if 
they are unsure about the government’s ongoing commitment to liberalization. This 
methodology helps us identify settings that have statistical and economic power to examine the 
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impact of liberalization on the cost of capital. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Measurement of the cost of capital 
We measure the cost of capital for a firm as the internal rate of return that equates the 
current stock price with the expected sequence of future (abnormal) earnings (e.g., Gebhardt et 
al., 2001; Hail and Leuz, 2006). This implied cost of capital approach offers significant 
advantages in the context of liberalization over other approaches that rely on either realized 
stock returns or dividend yields to infer the cost of capital effects. As discussed in Stulz (1999), 
the key issue with using realized stock returns in the context of liberalizations is that one 
typically requires a long time series of returns to reliably estimate the cost of capital effects 
using this approach. The multi-stage nature of the liberalization, however, makes this 
infeasible. For example, as discussed above, Korea underwent multiple liberalization shocks 
in 1991 and 1998 and the gap between adjacent shocks is not sufficient to permit reliable 
estimation of cost of capital effects using any approach that requires a long-time series of data. 
Stulz (1999) illustrates how applying a stock return-based approach in such a situation can lead 
to dramatically incorrect inferences. Use of dividend yields is also problematic in the context 
of liberalizations because growth opportunities directly affect dividend yields, making it 
difficult to disentangle the growth effects from the cost of capital effects (e.g., Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
 By providing cost of capital estimates at a point in time, the implied cost of capital 
approach circumvents the issues above that are associated with using realized returns or 
dividend yields. We exploit this characteristic of the implied cost of capital approach to 
examine cost of capital changes around relatively narrow liberalization-shock windows, in an 
attempt to minimize concerns about the effects of growth and other confounding events. 
Furthermore, this approach allows us to adjust for forward expectations of growth using analyst 
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forecasts, thus providing a better differentiation of cost of capital and growth effects (Hail and 
Leuz, 2006, 2009).  
 A key challenge with the use of implied cost of capital measures is the possibility of 
anticipation effects. If investors learn about upcoming liberalization events in advance, then 
the implied cost of capital measures could respond prior to the actual liberalization event, 
making it difficult to detect any changes in cost of capital around the liberalization event. Henry 
(2000), however, finds that for 7 of the 12 emerging market countries in his sample, the earliest 
news of liberalization appears in media either on or after the actual liberalization date; and, for 
3 of the 5 remaining countries, the news appears only a month in advance. He also finds that 
the earliest the stock prices begin to move is about 8 months prior to the month of liberalization, 
with the strongest returns occurring in the month of liberalization itself. We follow a 
conservative strategy to address this issue by dropping the year prior to the liberalization shocks 
from our sample. This allows us to compare the cost of capital after the liberalization to the 
cost of capital in the pre-period when markets are likely to have little knowledge about the 
upcoming liberalization shock.11 
 One may also be concerned about the possibility that investors may be able to anticipate 
the liberalization events in our sample at the time of initial reforms that occurred in the late 
1980s or early 1990s. We view this possibility as quite remote. As shown in Table 1, the 
liberalization events in our sample on average occur 9.7 years [8.8 years] after the initial 
liberalization based on the dates in Bekaert and Harvey (2000)  [Mitton, 2006]. It is unlikely 
that market participants would be able to anticipate and capitalize in stock prices the effect of 
events almost a decade in advance, especially given the instability and uncertainty that 
characterizes the policy environments in the emerging market countries. Indeed, Edison and 
Warnock (2003, 2008), highlight that even after the initial liberalization reforms, emerging 
                                                          
11 Our inferences are robust if we do not drop the prior year. 
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market countries exhibit considerable diversity in the speed, timing, and extent to which they 
pursue their liberalization program, with few countries even exhibiting temporary reversals of 
prior liberalization events (e.g., Zimbabwe, Malaysia, and Venezuela). Furthermore, 
anticipation of liberalization events, if it affects our analysis, is only likely to bias us against 
finding cost of capital effects. Therefore, one can view our estimates as lower bounds on the 
effects of liberalization.  
 We adopt four of the most commonly used models to measure the implied cost of 
capital: Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Easton (2004), and Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005). All four models are consistent with the discounted dividend valuation 
model, but exploit basic accounting relations to obtain an equivalent valuation equation based 
on residual income or abnormal earnings. We substitute market price and forecasts of abnormal 
earnings using analyst forecasts in these models to back out the implied cost of capital. The 
individual models differ with respect to the use of analyst forecast data, the assumptions 
regarding short-term and long-term growth, the explicit forecasting horizon, the incorporation 
of industry effects, and the integration of inflation into the steady-state terminal value. We 
closely follow the approach in Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009) in making the required assumptions. 
In the Appendix we summarize the four models, describe the key assumptions, and discuss the 
data requirements. Following Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), we use the average of the cost of 
capital estimates from the four models as our main measure of implied cost of capital (COC).  
Despite their appeal for our setting, implied cost of capital models have their own 
limitations. They require the assumption that consensus analyst forecasts are reasonable 
proxies for the market’s expectations of future earnings, which might not always be the case 
(e.g., Easton and Sommers, 2007; Frankel and Lee, 1998). The models also limit the sample to 
firms that financial analysts cover and have positive earnings forecasts. We gauge the 
sensitivity of our results to the model assumptions.  
14 
 
3.2. Empirical Specification 
We identify the year of the first large jump in equity market liberalization (as explained 
in Subsection 2.2) and use a standard difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to examine the 
effect of equity market liberalization on the pricing of information asymmetry. Specifically, 
we estimate the following two specifications to explore the cost of capital effects of 
liberalization:  
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐.𝑡𝑡 +  Γ𝐿𝐿 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,        (3) 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐.𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +
                 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐.𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + Γ𝐿𝐿 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,        (4) 
where COC is firm i’s implied cost of capital for year t. Consistent with Hail and Leuz (2009), 
we measure cost of capital as of month+10 after the fiscal-year end t to ensure the accounting 
information for the fiscal year is reflected in stock prices. Subscript s denotes the industry to 
which firm i belongs and subscript c denotes the country where the firm is located. POST-
LIBERALIZATION is a dummy variable that takes a value of one starting the year a country 
first experiences a change in the restrictions of foreign ownership that is in the top tercile across 
all country-year changes, and zero otherwise. We verify the robustness of our results using 
several alternative definitions of liberalization shocks. BIDASK is a measure of the firm-level 
information asymmetry; we calculate it as the annual median of the bid-ask spreads in equity 
prices prevailing during fiscal year t. Z denotes a vector of control variables that we discuss 
below.  
The specification also includes industry-year interactive fixed effects (i.e., a separate 
fixed effect, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡, for each industry-year combination) and country-fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐). Inclusion 
of the industry-year interactive fixed effects ensures that we are comparing treatment and 
control firms that operate in the same industry, allowing us to “difference away” unobserved 
time-varying industry shocks (Gormley and Matsa, 2013). This is important because 
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lliberalization events are likely to coincide with expansions in the growth prospects of 
industries that are crucial to the local economy. We measure these fixed effects using the 
industry classification in Campbell (1996). We include country-fixed effects to remove any 
unobserved cross-sectional variation in country characteristics that may drive the results. 
With the above fixed effect structure, equation (3) represents a generalized DiD 
specification (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Bertrand, et al., 2004). Specifically, the 
coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION measures the average change in the cost of capital for 
firms in countries that experience liberalization shocks relative to the average contemporaneous 
change in the cost of capital of firms that operate in the same industry, but in countries that do 
not experience liberalization shocks. As explained in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), the 
above regression framework exploits the staggered timing of liberalization events. The 
staggered timing implies that the control group includes not only firms in countries that that 
never experience liberalization shocks during our sample period, but also firms in countries 
that did not experience liberalization at time t, even if liberalization may have taken place for 
these firms before or after time t.   
In equation (4), we build upon equation (3) to examine the effect of liberalization on 
the pricing of information asymmetry. The coefficient on BIDASK provides an estimate of the 
price of information asymmetry in the periods prior to the liberalization shocks. The key 
coefficient of interest is the coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK, which is the 
DiD estimate of the effect of liberalization shocks on the price of information asymmetry. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimates the change in the price of information asymmetry (as 
assessed by the mapping of bid-ask spread into the cost of capital) for firms in countries that 
experience liberalization shocks relative to the change for firms in the same industry but 
operating in countries that do not experience liberalization shocks. If equity market 
liberalization reduces the price of information asymmetry, the coefficient on POST-
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LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK should be negative. We estimate the above specifications using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and obtain standard errors by clustering at the country level.  
A natural issue with any international study such as ours is that the control and treatment 
observations are drawn from different countries, raising concerns about the validity of the 
parallel trends assumption underlying our DiD design. To address this issue, we test for parallel 
trends in periods prior to the liberalization shocks and find supportive evidence. In an additional 
test, we also obtain within country identification using variation in the benefits of liberalization 
and obtain similar inferences.   
An important point to note is that when we discuss the economic magnitudes of the 
effect of liberalization, we focus on the DiD coefficient on POST-
LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK. We avoid reading too strongly into the magnitudes of the levels 
of the price of information asymmetry in either the pre- or post-liberalization period. The key 
issue is that these estimates (unlike the DiD estimate) are based on simple cross-sectional 
comparisons of firms with high and low information asymmetry and therefore are likely to be 
contaminated by measurement error and uncontrolled for cross-sectional differences. The issue 
of measurement error is particularly acute in our setting because the cost of capital measures 
are known to contain significant noise. As a result, in the cross-section at any point in time, the 
mapping between information asymmetry and the cost of capital likely entails significant noise. 
As a consequence, it could be subject to attenuation bias. This effect of measurement error, 
however, is likely to be purged out of our DiD estimate, which is estimated based on changes 
in the price of information asymmetry.12  
3.3. Control variables 
                                                          
12 One can see this with the help of an example. Suppose the true price of a unit of IA is 20 bps in the pre-period 
and 10 bps in the post-period. However, because of the attenuation bias caused by measurement error in the 
underlying proxies, allow for the fact that one underestimates the price by 10 bps in both the pre- and post-periods. 
In this example, our DiD design would correctly estimate the effect of liberalization on the price of IA to be 10 
bps. But the fact that a unit of IA is priced at 0 bps in the post-period reflects measurement error and not that 
information asymmetry is not priced in the post-period. 
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Our control variables closely follow Hail and Leuz (2009). Our controls for firm-level 
characteristics include firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of book value of assets 
(LOGSIZE), stock return variability (RETVAR), measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns over the last 12 months, and leverage (LEVERAGE), measured as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets.13 Based on prior studies, we expect the cost of capital to exhibit a 
negative association with firm size, and positive associations with return variability and 
financial leverage (e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Hail and Leuz, 2009). 
We include bias in analyst forecasts (FBIAS) as an additional control because forecast 
bias can affect implied cost of capital estimates (Easton and Sommers, 2007). FBIAS equals 
the one year ahead IBES analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year minus 
actual earnings) scaled by lagged total assets. We measure control variables and bid-ask 
spreads as of the fiscal-year end. However, as noted in the previous section and, consistent with 
Hail and Leuz (2009), we measure the cost of capital as of month+10 after the fiscal-year end 
to ensure accounting information for the fiscal year is reflected in stock prices. In equation (3), 
we also control for the country-level inflation rate at the end of the fiscal year (INFLATION) 
in all of our regressions. We express analyst forecasts in nominal terms and local currency, 
which implies that the resulting estimates for the cost of capital reflect countries’ expected 
inflation rates. As investors’ expectations for future inflation are only imperfectly observable, 
we introduce a separate control variable for cross-sectional differences in inflation.  
3.4. Data sources and sample description 
We obtain information on accounting variables from Datastream, Worldscope, and 
Bloomberg; analyst earnings and growth forecasts are from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S); and macroeconomic data are from the World Bank and Datastream. We 
                                                          
13 We do not use the market value of equity to measure firm size because, as argued in Hail and Leuz (2009), this 
variable could absorb the hypothesized effect if liberalization indeed decreases the cost of capital and leads to 
increased valuations. 
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obtain information on bid-ask spreads from Datastream and Bloomberg. As explained in 
Subsection 3.1, we control for contamination in our estimates resulting from anticipation of 
liberalization events by dropping the year prior to the liberalization shocks. Our final sample 
contains firms for which information on all required variables is available and comprises a 
maximum of 8,474 firm-year observations; this represents over 2,927 firms from 23 emerging 
market countries from the 1996 to 2006 period. BIDASK spreads are widely available only 
from 1996 and not for all firms. Accordingly, we base our tests involving BIDASK on a 
relatively smaller sample of 5,694 observations. More details about our sample construction 
are in the Appendix. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our measures of the cost of capital and control 
variables. The mean (median) cost of capital is 15.5% (13.6%). Because our sample is 
comprised of emerging market countries that tend to be riskier than developed countries 
examined in prior studies, not surprisingly these estimates are somewhat higher than the 
estimates in Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009).  
4. Results  
4.1. Main results 
As a baseline, we first examine the effect of liberalization on the cost of capital by 
presenting OLS estimates of equation (3) in Table 3. Our key coefficient of interest is the 
coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION. The results in column (1) show that the coefficient 
on POST-LIBERALIZATION is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.006; t-stat = -2.965), 
suggesting that post-liberalization firms experience a reduction in cost of capital. In terms of 
economic magnitude, the results suggests that firms on average experienced a 60 bps reduction 
in cost of capital following a top-tercile shock to liberalization, which on average is equivalent 
to a 15% increase in the limit on foreign ownership. Consistent with prior literature, we also 
find a positive and significant coefficient on INFLATION, a negative coefficient on LOGSIZE, 
19 
 
a positive coefficient on RETVAR, positive coefficient on LEVERAGE, and a positive 
coefficient on FBIAS (e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Hail and Leuz, 2009). This model 
explains about 30% of the international variation in the cost of equity capital, which is 
consistent with prior work (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2006, 2009). 
We also re-estimate the specification for a smaller subsample of observations that have 
non-missing BIDASK spreads. Given that the main focus of the remainder of this study is the 
pricing of information asymmetry, it is important to ensure that the results are not sensitive to 
the sample attrition. The results in column (2) in Table 3 indicate that the results that 
liberalization reduces the cost of capital continues to hold with similar statistical and economic 
significance (coefficient = -0.007; t-stat =-3.811). 
We next turn our attention to the main specification of interest, equation (4), which 
examines how liberalization affects the price of information asymmetry. Column (3) of Table 
3 presents the results.  Our key coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term 
between POST-LIBERALIZATION and BIDASK, which provides the DiD estimate of the effect 
of liberalization on the pricing of information asymmetry. The coefficient on BIDASK is an 
estimate of the price of information asymmetry prior to the liberalization shock. It can be seen 
that the coefficient on BIDASK is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.413; t-stat = 3.450), 
suggesting that information asymmetry is priced on average prior to the liberalization shocks. 
Most importantly, we find that the coefficient for POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK is 
negative and significant (coefficient = -0.312; t-stat = -2.874), suggesting that the price of 
information asymmetry declines following liberalization shocks.  
We next discuss the economic significance of the effect of liberalization shocks on the 
price of information asymmetry. For reasons explained in Subsection 3.2, we avoid reading too 
strongly into the magnitudes of the levels of the price of information asymmetry either in the 
pre- or post-liberalization period. These results are based on a cross-sectional comparison of 
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firms with high and low information asymmetry, and therefore are likely to be contaminated 
by measurement error and uncontrolled for cross-sectional differences. Instead, we focus our 
discussion around the DiD estimate of the effect on the price of information asymmetry, which 
is designed to mitigate the above issues that are typically associated with estimates based on 
simple cross-sectional comparisons. The estimate of coefficient on POST-
LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK implies that the price discount associated with an increase in bid-
ask spreads equivalent to the interquartile range (i.e., increase from the bottom to the top 
quartile) decreases by about 37 bps following a liberalization shock.14 We caution readers from 
comparing our estimates to the ones obtained in prior work (Armstrong et al., 2011; Akins et 
al., 2011) because of the interpretational challenges associated with using firm-level 
shareholding patterns to measure competition (see footnote 2).  Furthermore, while prior 
studies focus on U.S. capital markets, our estimates are based on emerging markets. 
4.2. Assessing parallel trends and the timing of cost of capital changes 
In this Subsection, we explore the timing of cost of capital changes to test the parallel 
trends assumption underlying our DiD design and to examine the persistence of the effects. We 
do so by estimating modified versions of the regression specifications in which we replace the 
POST-LIBERALIZATION indicator with separate indicator variables for years leading up to the 
shock and after the shock. Specifically, we include indicators (POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) 
and POST-LIBERALIZATION (-1)) for the periods two-years and one-year prior to the 
liberalization announcement. We also include POST-LIBERALIZATION (0), POST-
LIBERALIZATION (1), POST-LIBERALIZATION (2), and POST-LIBERALIZATION (3), 
which are indicator variables for the year of, one-year after, two-years after, and three-years 
after a country experiences a liberalization shock.15 Finally, POST-LIBERALIZATION (>4) is 
                                                          
14 This is estimated as the (interquartile range of BIDASK)*(coefficient on BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION) 
= 0.012*0.312 = 0.37%. 
15 Because our sample is constrained to begin from 1996 (due to unavailability of bid-ask spread data) and 10 
(out of total 13) of the liberalization shocks occur in years 1999 or before, we do not have sufficient pre-period 
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a dummy that takes a value of one if a country experienced a liberalization shock four or more 
years ago.  
Table 4, Panel A presents evidence on the timing of average cost of capital changes in 
a tabular format and Figure 2 also presents a time-series plot of the coefficient estimates. In 
support of the parallel trends assumption, the estimates show that the coefficients on POST-
LIBERALIZATION (-1) and POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) are both statistically and 
economically insignificant. Furthermore, the coefficients on liberalization shock dummies for 
the year of the shock and after the shock continue to be significant, suggesting that 
liberalization shocks are associated with persistent declines in the cost of capital.  
Finally, Table 4, Panel B and Figure 3 presents evidence on the timing of changes in 
the price of information asymmetry around the liberalization shocks. It can be seen that the 
coefficients on POST-LIBERALIZATION(-2)*BIDASK and POST-LIBERALIZATION(-
1)*BIDASK are both statistically and economically insignificant. This suggests that treatment 
and control firms do not exhibit any differential trends in their pricing of information 
asymmetry prior to a liberalization shock. It can also be seen that our DiD estimate of the 
decline in the price of information asymmetry is persistent and remains statistically and 
economically significant in the years after the liberalization. Specifically, the coefficient on 
BIDASK *POST-LIBERALIZATION(0) is -0.376 (t-stat; = -2.678), which is very similar to the 
coefficient on BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(>4) of -0.311 (t-stat = -2.395). These 
results help rule out the possibility that temporary price pressures drive our results (Harris and 
Guerel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986).  
                                                          
data to construct reliable tests of parallel trends using dummies for years prior to POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2). 
Consider a liberalization shock to country A in 1999. For country A, we would have only 2 years of pre-shock 
data: 1997 (POST-LIBERALIZATION(-2)) and 1996  (POST-LIBERALIZATION(-1)). As a result, shocks in 
1999 or before, cannot contribute to the identification of coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION(-3). 
Coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION (-3), if included in the regression, would only be informed by 3 of the 
13 shocks that occur after 1999. As an imperfect solution, in the internet appendix, we examine pre-trends for 
two additional years in cost of capital movements (and not pricing of information asymmetry) by expanding our 
sample to include years 1995 and 1994. We find that the coefficient on all pre-liberalization dummies is not 
significantly different from zero in this analysis. 
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4.3.  Sensitivity to key research design choices  
We next explore the robustness of our main results on the pricing of information 
asymmetry to four key research design choices: fixed effects structure, measurement of 
BIDASK, measurement of liberalization shocks, and measurement of cost of capital. Table 5, 
Panel A presents the robustness of our results to use of three alternative fixed effect structures. 
The results in columns (1) and (2) show that our findings are robust to use of two relatively 
simpler fixed structures that combine (i) country and year fixed effects and (ii) country, year, 
and industry fixed effects. We next examine the robustness of our findings to augmenting the 
fixed structure we employ in our main analyses (i.e., country and industry-year interactive fixed 
effects) with firm fixed effects to absorb the effect of any time-invariant firm characteristics. 
The results in column (3) show that our findings are robust under these specifications.  
In Panel B of Table 5, we explore the robustness of our findings to different ways of 
measuring BIDASK. First, we control for skewness in the BIDASK measure by examining the 
robustness of our results to the use of ranked BIDASK measures (median, quartile, quintile, and 
decile ranks). The results in columns (1) - (4) reveal that our results continue to hold to the use 
of these alternative measures. We next attempt to better isolate the information asymmetry 
component of the BIDASK spread in addition to taking the skewness into account. We do so 
employing a two-step approach. In the first-step, we regress the natural logarithm of BIDASK 
spread on the natural logarithm of lagged values of market capitalization, stock return volatility, 
and share turnover.16 The natural logarithm of the BIDASK accounts for the skewness while 
regressing on measures of market capitalization, stock return volatility, and share turnover 
helps isolate the information asymmetry component of the BIDASK.  We then use the residual 
from this first-step regression (RESIDUAL_BIDASK) as an alternative measure of information 
                                                          
16 Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Christensen et al. 2017), the first stage regression produces a negative and 
significant coefficient on the logged values of lagged  market value of equity and share turnover and positive 
(although insignificant) coefficient on the logged value of lagged stock return volatility.  
23 
 
asymmetry (Daske et al., 2008) and re-estimate Equation (4) as a second stage. 
RESIDUAL_BIDASK has a mean of zero (by construction) and has a standard deviation of 
0.017. The results in column (5) from the second stage show that our inferences are robust to 
the use of this alternative measure of information asymmetry. 
Next, we examine the robustness of our results to several alternative ways of measuring 
the liberalization shock. The results in Panel C of Table 5 show that our inferences are robust 
to using many alternative measures of the shock including a top quintile shock (column (1)), 
top median shock (column (2)), and a shock that is twice the median shock (column (3)). We 
also examine the sensitivity of our results to using a decile ranked measure of the changes in 
the continuous liberalization measure and the results in column (4) show that our inferences 
hold.  
Finally, we present several robustness checks that are related to the cost of capital 
estimations. First, we examine whether our findings hold for each of the four individual implied 
cost of capital models. Table 5, Panel D presents the results using estimates from each of the 
four models. The results are consistent with our findings in Table 3. Specifically, across all 
four models, the coefficients for BIDASK are positive and significant, while the coefficients 
for BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION are negative and significant. Moreover, the coefficients 
have similar magnitudes to those in Table 3 across all models. These results suggest that our 
findings do not depend on the choice of a particular cost of capital model.  
Next, we gauge the sensitivity of our results to the use of risk premiums instead of raw 
cost of capital estimates. We calculate risk premium as COC minus the risk-free rate on the 
U.S. Treasury bill. The results in column (1) of Table 5, Panel E show that using a risk premium 
does not alter our findings from Table 3. Finally, we consider the robustness of our results to 
the use of alternative assumptions about the long-run growth rate that affects terminal value. 
Changing assumptions about growth beyond the explicit forecasting horizon affects only two 
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of the four valuation models: Claus and Thomas (2001) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005). In line with Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), we consider two alternative assumptions about 
long-run growth. First, we set the long-run growth rate equal to a country’s annual real GDP 
growth rate plus its long-run inflation rate, where we measure the latter as the median inflation 
over the sample period. Second, we assume a constant inflation rate of 3% across countries. 
While the first specification allows for perpetual differences in growth rate across countries, 
the second specification assumes that growth rates in equilibrium converge to zero real growth 
rate (or 3% nominal growth rate). The results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, Panel E show 
that changing the long-run growth rate assumptions makes little difference to our results. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 provide robust evidence that removal of restrictions on 
foreign ownership results in a decrease in the pricing of information asymmetry in our sample.   
4.4. Could concurrent growth shocks and/or other reforms drive our results? 
 We show that the treatment and control countries exhibit parallel movements in their 
price of information asymmetry in the years leading up to the liberalization shocks. 
Nevertheless, an important concern in any DiD setting is whether the parallel trends would 
have continued in the post-treatment period absent any changes in restrictions on foreign 
ownership. This concern affects our setting because liberalizations typically accompany 
expansions in growth prospects, as well as other reforms such as macroeconomic stabilization, 
easing of exchange controls, and trade liberalization. Therefore, to the extent our specifications 
do not fully absorb the effect of growth opportunities and other concurrent reforms, possibility 
exists that our inferences could be confounded by these other concurrent events. In this 
subsection, we provide two analyses to address this concern. 
4.4.1. Placebo tests based on opening of other financial markets 
We conduct a series of placebo tests by examining the effect of liberalization of four 
financial markets other than equity markets: money markets, bond markets, derivative markets, 
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and government securities markets. The liberalization of these other markets provides 
compelling placebos for two reasons. First, similar to equity markets, the desire to attract 
foreign capital flows drives the liberalization of these markets. Therefore, similar to equity 
markets, the liberalization for these markets would also be expected to be accompanied by 
expansions in growth prospects and other reforms that tend to accompany general 
liberalizations of financial markets. Second, there is no reason to expect that increased external 
capital flows in bonds, money market instruments, derivatives, and/or government securities 
markets will have a bearing on the pricing of information asymmetry in equity markets. To 
identify liberalization shocks in these alternative markets, we use data from Fernández et al. 
(2016) and Schindler (2009). These authors build a binary measure of liberalization in various 
capital markets based on information in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). For each financial market, the data provides a binary 
outcome variable based on the authors’ assessment of the regulatory restrictions. We create 
dummy variables for the opening up of these alternative financial markets based on these binary 
measures and re-estimate equation (4) using these placebo shocks.17  
We present the results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 6. The results show that the effect of 
opening of these markets on price of information asymmetry is economically and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.18 This suggests that any changes in countries’ growth prospects 
                                                          
17 We identify the liberalization shock based on the first year in our sample period when the binary variable 
corresponding to purchase restrictions by non-residents switches from restricted (one) to unrestricted (zero) in the 
respective markets. 
18 In the Internet Appendix, we also present results of a falsification test in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) to 
gauge the extent to which concurrent local growth/economic shocks could be driving our results. Christensen et 
al. (2016) and Christensen et al. (2017) have employed this strategy  to rule out concurrent confounds. Specifically, 
under this approach, we first regress our implied cost of capital measures on a set of three proxies based on prior 
work (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) that are expected to be strongly correlated with local growth/economic 
shocks: GDP growth, stock market valuation as a fraction of GDP, and trade as a percentage of GDP. We use this 
first-stage regression to create a predicted value for the implied cost of capital based on these variables. We use 
the predicted value as the dependent variable in our main DiD specification used to measure the effect of 
liberalization on the cost of capital. We find that the coefficient on POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK is 
statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero, which suggests that our main specifications are 
effective at absorbing the confounding effect of concurrent growth/other economic shocks. 
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or other reforms that tend to accompany a general opening up of financial markets are unlikely 
to drive our main results. 
4.4.2. Within country identification using ADRs 
In our second analysis to address this concern, we exploit purely within-country 
variation to estimate the effect of liberalization. By holding the country constant, this analysis 
mitigates concerns that omitted country-level factors could be driving our results. This analysis 
is based on the observation that the effect of liberalization within a country should be relatively 
muted for firms that already have access to foreign capital through listing of American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs). For this test, we first identify firms that have outstanding ADRs 
at the beginning of a fiscal year. We obtain information on cross listing from a variety of 
sources including the Bank of New York, J.P. Morgan, Citibank, the NYSE, the NASDAQ, 
and CRSP database. We include both active and inactive listings using the data provided by 
Citibank and CRSP to mitigate concerns related to survivorship bias. Our sample of cross-
listings includes exchange listings on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, as well as over-the-
counter (OTC) listings in the Pink Sheets or the OTC Bulletin Board, and private placements 
under Rule 144A.  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 present the results of equation (4) separately for 
subsamples of firms that are cross-listed and those that are not. It can be seen that the 
liberalization shocks reduce the price of information asymmetry only for firms without any ADRs. 
Specifically, while the coefficient on the interaction term between BIDASK and the 
liberalization shock dummy is negative and significant for the subgroup of firms without an 
ADR (coefficient = -0.367; t-stat = 2.480), it is positive and not significantly different from 
zero for the ADR group (coefficient = 0.185; t-stat = 1.184). A potential concern is that lack of 
statistical power due to the smaller sample size drives the insignificant results for the ADR 
subgroup. Inconsistent with this explanation, however, we find that the coefficient on BIDASK 
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is positive and significant at 1% level for both subsamples and it is only the effect of 
liberalization that is insignificant in the ADR group.  Furthermore, if it is purely statistical 
power that is driving the difference, then we would expect the magnitude of the DiD estimates 
to be similar across the two groups; we, however, do not find that to be the case with a 
coefficient of 0.185 for the ADR group and -0.367 for the group without ADRs.19 
4.5. Role of home country institutions 
In this subsection, we explore how the quality of home country institutions affects the 
benefits of liberalization on the pricing of information asymmetry. The impact of institutional 
quality is not obvious. On the one hand, because poor institutional infrastructure and corporate 
governance can thwart local investor participation in equity markets, countries with poor 
institutions are more likely to approximate imperfect capital markets prior to the liberalization. 
Consequently, such countries may benefit more from the addition of foreign investors 
following liberalization. One the other hand, poor quality local institutions can act as implicit 
barriers to economic integration even if a country removes explicit regulatory barriers through 
equity market liberalization (e.g., Bae and Goyal, 2010; Carrieri et al., 2013; Stulz, 2005). For 
example, foreign investors may not feel comfortable investing in countries with poor foreign 
investor protection even if the rules permit their participation. In this scenario, poor local 
institutional quality may reduce the benefits of liberalization by preventing foreign investor 
participation.  
In Table 7, we explore the role of several features of a country’s institutional 
environment. We partition the sample into subgroups based on institutional characteristics, and 
                                                          
19 We discuss an additional within country test in the Internet Appendix. This analysis is based on the observation 
that most country-level liberalization policies explicitly leave out regulated industries (Bekaert et al., 2007). Thus, 
we expect the effect of liberalization shocks to be muted for firms in regulated industries. However, an important 
empirical issue is in identifying these regulated industries, which tend to differ across countries. Nevertheless, 
using two alternative definitions of regulated industries, we find that the decline in the pricing of information 
asymmetry following liberalization is concentrated only in unregulated industries and is insignificant in the 
subsample of regulated industries.   
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run separate regressions for each subsample. The regressions generating the results in Table 7 
have the same control variables as for the regressions for Table 3, but we do not report the 
coefficient estimates on these variables for brevity. We focus on how the coefficients for 
BIDASK and POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK vary across subsamples with different 
country characteristics.  
We focus on the following variables to measure variation in institutional quality and 
governance. First, following Hail and Leuz (2006), we measure the strength of securities 
regulation as the mean of the disclosure index, the liability standard index, and the public 
enforcement index. We use a dummy variable, which that takes a value of one if the country 
has a value on the index that is above the median across all countries, and zero otherwise. All 
securities regulation variables stem from La Porta et al. (2006). Second, we measure the extent 
of insider trading activities using a dummy variable that equals one following the year when 
insider trading laws were first enforced (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bushman et al., 2005). 
In countries where insider trading laws are not enforced, the likelihood that insiders have an 
informational advantage is higher. Third, we measure the extent of investor protection using 
the investor protection index from La Porta et al. (2006). Fourth, we measure the extent of 
insider ownership as the average percentage of common shares owned by the top three 
shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country 
(Bae et al., Tan, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). We define a dummy variable that takes a value 1 
(High) if the ownership by insiders is above-median and 0 (Low), otherwise. Higher insider 
ownership implies there is more potential for poor corporate governance and information-based 
trades. Fifth, we examine the effect of the origin of the legal system of a country. La Porta et 
al. (1998) point out the importance of legal origin in explaining the economic and financial 
institutions in a country and argue that English common law provides better protection of 
individual rights against the state. Thus, we employ origin of the legal system as a dummy 
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variable that is equal to one if the country is of English law origin and zero otherwise. Finally, 
we employ an overall measure of accountability of institutions from Kurtzman et al. (2004), 
which is a country level index reflecting a country’s level of corruption, efficacy of the legal 
system, deleterious economic policies, inadequacy of accounting and governance practices, 
and detrimental regulatory structures We construct this index following the methodology of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001).20  
Estimates in Table 7 show that across all specifications the benefits of liberalization 
through reductions in the pricing of information asymmetry are concentrated in countries with 
poor institutions and corporate governance prior to the liberalization shocks. For example, the 
coefficient on the POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK is negative and significant for countries 
where securities regulations are poor (coefficient = -0.384) and there is low enforcement of 
insider trading laws (coefficient = -0.270), while the coefficient is negative but economically 
small and statistically insignificant for the countries where the securities regulations are good 
and insider trading laws are better enforced. Further, in countries where there is civil law the 
impact of a large liberalization event (coefficient = -0.407) is about 60% greater than countries 
with common law (coefficient = -0.255). These findings suggest that the benefits of 
liberalization in terms of the pricing of information asymmetry accrue largely to countries that 
have imperfectly competitive capital markets due to poor institutional infrastructures.  
5. Conclusion 
Using the equity market liberalization of 23 emerging market countries between 1996 
and 2006, we examine the effect of expanding an economy’s investor base to include foreign 
                                                          
20 As noted in Kurtzman et al. (2004), the accountability index draws upon 65 objective variables from 41 sources 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Securities Services Association, the 
PRS group, the International Country Risk Guide, and regulators in individual countries. The index uses the 
variables to create five sub-indices measuring a country’s level of corruption, efficacy of the legal system, 
deleterious economic policies, inadequacy of accounting and governance practices, and detrimental regulatory 
structures. The accountability index is the simple average of these five sub-indices. Other studies that use this 
measure include Boubakri et al. (2013), Brouthers et al. (2008), and Guedhami and Pittman (2006).  
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investors on the pricing of information asymmetry. We find evidence of a significant decline 
in the pricing of information asymmetry as countries remove regulatory restrictions on foreign 
ownership. We also find that this benefit of liberalization accrues primarily to firms that do not 
already have access to foreign capital through ADRs and to economies that have poor 
institutional infrastructures and corporate governance.  
Our study addresses a significant challenge associated with measuring aggregate 
competition in trying to assess its effect on the pricing of information asymmetry. The firm-
level measures of competition used in extant studies implicitly assume that investors who 
decline to hold stock do not contribute to the overall risk-bearing capacity and, hence, do not 
influence the price of risk. However, the mere expectation that these investors might step in to 
purchase shares if the price of risk were to fall sufficiently low allows these investors to affect 
share prices without necessarily holding the stock. We address this challenge by measuring 
shocks to risk-bearing capacity at the economy level. Furthermore, the plausibly exogenous 
nature of the liberalization shocks also allows us to mitigate concerns that are associated with 
using endogenous variation in competition based on firm-level shareholding patterns. Finally, 
our findings also enhance our understanding of the economic consequences of increased 
foreign investor participation by examining its effect on pricing of information asymmetry.   
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Appendix 
A. Implied cost of equity capital models 
All of the four methods we examine are derived from same underlying valuation model, 
i.e., the dividend discount model. The Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
models are based on the residual income valuation models and specify valuation using return 
on equity. Residual income is defined as forecasted earnings per share less a cost of capital 
charge for the beginning of the fiscal year book value of equity. Both models assume clean 
surplus accounting which requires that earnings are fully allocated between dividends and 
retained earnings (i.e., whatever portion of earnings that is not paid out in dividends) is added 
to the book value of equity. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) 
The valuation equation in Claus and Thomas (2001) is given by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + ∑
(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘−𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶∗𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘−1)
(1+𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇
𝑘𝑘=1 +
(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶−𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶∗𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶−1)(1+𝑔𝑔)
(𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑔𝑔)(1+𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶
, 
where Pt is the market price of a firm’s stock at time t, bv is the book value per share at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, eps is the expected future earnings per share using either explicit 
analyst forecasts or derived from growth forecasts, g is the expected perpetual future growth 
rate, and rCT is the implied cost of equity capital that is calculated as the internal rate of return 
of the above equation. In the model, we use actual book values per share and forecasted 
earnings per share up to five years ahead to derive the expected future residual income series. 
Dividends are set equal to a constant fraction of forecasted earnings. At time T = 5, it is assumed 
that the nominal residual income grows at rate g. As a proxy for g, we use the annualized 
median of country-specific one-year ahead realized monthly inflation rates.  
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
The valuation equation in Gebhardt et al. (2001) is given by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + ∑
(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘−𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺∗𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘−1)
(1+𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇
𝑘𝑘=1 +
(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶+1−𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺∗𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡+𝐶𝐶)
𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺∗(1+𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)𝐶𝐶
, 
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where Pt is the market price of a firm’s stock at time t, bv is the book value per share at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, eps is the expected future earnings per share using either explicit 
analyst forecasts or derived from growth forecasts, g is the expected perpetual future growth 
rate, and rGLS is the implied cost of equity capital that is calculated as the internal rate of return 
of the above equation. In this model, we use explicit forecasts of earnings for the first three 
years, followed by a nine-year period in which the return on equity (ROE) linearly reverts to 
the industry median ROE [based on Campbell (1996)]. The industry median ROE is calculated 
using the past three years of data in a given country. From T = 12, the residual income is 
assumed to be constant.  
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
The valuation equation in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1
(𝑟𝑟𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂−𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠−𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙)
𝑟𝑟𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂(𝑟𝑟𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂−𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙)
, 
where Pt is the market price of a firm’s stock at time t, eps is the expected future earnings per 
share using either explicit analyst forecasts or derived from growth forecasts, gs is the expected 
short-term future growth rate, d is the expected future net dividends per share derived from the 
dividend payout ratio times the earnings per share, gl is the expected long-term future growth 
rate, and rOJN is the implied cost of equity capital that is calculated as the internal rate of return 
of the above equation. Gode and Mohanram (2003) implement this theoretical model of Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) by assuming that the short-term growth rate is equal to the average 
of the forecasted growth rate between year one and year two and the average five-year growth 
rate provided by analysts. We adopt the same approach. Furthermore, Gode and Mohanram 
assume that the long-term growth rate is equal to expected inflation for all firms. We use the 
annualized median of country-specific one-year ahead realized monthly inflation rates.  
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Easton (2004) 
The valuation equation in Easton (2004) for the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio 
model is: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺∗𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+2−𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1
𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺∗𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺
, 
where Pt is the market price of a firm’s stock at time t, eps is the expected future earnings per 
share using either explicit analyst forecasts or derived from growth forecasts, gs is the expected 
short-term future growth rate, d is the expected future net dividends per share derived from the 
dividend payout ratio times the earnings per share, and rMPEG is the implied cost of equity 
capital that is calculated as the internal rate of return of the above equation. It uses one-year 
ahead and two-year ahead earnings per share forecasts, as well as expected dividends per share 
in period t + 1 to derive a measure of abnormal earnings growth. Dividends are set equal to a 
constant fraction of forecasted earnings. In this model, we assume that the growth rate in the 
change in dividends is equal to zero so that dividends grow by the same dollar amount every 
year into perpetuity. 
Data requirements and implementation 
We closely follow Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009) in the implementation of these implied 
cost of capital models for an international sample of firms. We obtain information on all 
dead/inactive stocks and include them in the sample. Inclusion of inactive stocks ensures that 
we do not have survivorship bias. We obtain firm-specific stock price and analyst earnings per 
share forecasts and long-term growth forecasts from IBES. All estimates are mean analyst 
consensus forecasts and measured in local currency. For an observation to be included in our 
sample, we follow Hail and Leuz (2009) and apply the same filters. We require the current 
stock price data, analyst earnings per share for two periods ahead, and either a forecasted 
earnings per share for the three-years ahead or an estimate of long-term earnings growth. 
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Further, we use firms that only have positive earnings forecasts and growth rates.  
We gather financial data from Worldscope. Each of the four valuation models require 
an estimate of future dividends. Following Hail and Leuz (2009), we assume that the net 
dividends are a constant fraction of expected future earnings per share for all periods. The 
dividend ratio required for this calculation is obtained by averaging the ratios over the last three 
fiscal years. If this ratio is missing or outside the range of zero and one, we replace it by the 
median payout ratio for the country-year. The Gebhardt et al. (2001) model requires an 
industry-specific target return on equity. Following Hail and Leuz (2009), we first compute the 
average firm-level return on equity ratios over the last three years and then choose the median 
of these values for a given industry, country, and year. We replace missing or negative target 
ratios by the country/industry median and, if still missing or negative, by the country/year 
median.  
These models also require assumptions about long-term growth. Following Hail and 
Leuz (2009), we assume that, in the long-run, firms grow at the country’s inflation rate and use 
next year’s country-specific median of the realized monthly percentage changes in the 
Consumer Price Index as a proxy for future inflation. We replace negative values by the 
country’s historical inflation rate, computed as the median of the monthly inflation rates over 
the sample period. Similarly, we replace values exceeding 10% by the country’s historical 
inflation rate. 
We measure the cost of capital as of month +10 after the end of the fiscal year. This 
ensures that the market price and analyst expectations reflect financial statement information 
at the time of measurement. Valuation models, however, assume full year discounting. 
Therefore, following Hail and Leuz (2009), for consistent discounting, we first move 
month+10 prices to the beginning of the fiscal year and then use full year discounting. Since 
the valuation models do not have a unique closed-form solution, we use an iterative procedure 
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to determine the annual firm-specific discount rate that equates market price to the respective 
valuation models. We restrict our sample to firm-year observations where we were able to 
obtain estimates for all the four models. Moreover, to be included in the regression models in 
a given year, we require that a country has at least ten firms with all non-missing data.  
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Figure 1: Liberalization and the Investability Measure 
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Figure 2: Timing of changes in cost of capital   
This figure presents the timing of changes in cost of capital around liberalization shocks. ● represents 
coefficients that are insignificant while ■ represents coefficients that are significant. The bars represent the 90% 
confidence interval around the estimated coefficients. The horizontal axis presents the years relative to the shock 
year (t=0). 
 
 
Figure 3: Timing of changes in  pricing of information asymmetry   
This figure presents the timing of changes in pricing of information asymmetry around liberalization shocks. ● 
represents coefficients that are insignificant while ■ represents coefficients that are significant. The bars 
represent the 90% confidence interval around the estimated coefficients. The horizontal axis presents the years 
relative to the shock year (t=0). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Liberalization Measures 
 
Country Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Official 
Liberalization 
Year based on 
Bekaert & 
Harvey (2000) 
First firms 
investable 
from Mitton 
(2006) 
First Year of 
Top Tercile 
Shock in 
BIDASK 
Pricing 
Sample (1996-
2006) 
Argentina 0.9 0.9 0.001 1989 1988 None 
Brazil 0.86 0.85 0.014 1991 1988 1999 
Chile 0.86 0.87 0.033 1992 1988 None 
China 1.39 1.36 0.25 n/a 1992 1997 
Czech Republic 0.38 0.44 0.107 n/a 1994 1999 
Egypt 0.65 0.67 0.093 1992 n/a 1998 
Greece 1 0.96 0.077 1987 1988 2001 
Hungary 0.69 0.66 0.035 n/a 1992 1996 
Indonesia 0.8 0.69 0.188 1989 1990 1997 
India 0.29 0.42 0.212 1992 1992 2002 
Israel 1 0.99 0.006 1993 1997 None 
Korea, Republic 
of 0.9 0.84 0.206 1992 1992 1998 
Sri Lanka 0.28 0.28 0.01 1991 1992 None 
Mexico 0.69 0.68 0.023 1989 1988 None 
Malaysia 0.91 0.84 0.215 1988 1988 1997 
Pakistan 0.65 0.51 0.279 1991 1991 None 
Philippines 0.53 0.57 0.092 1991 1988 2004 
Poland 0.98 0.98 0.013 n/a 1992 None 
Portugal 1 0.9 0.125 1986 1988 1998 
Taiwan 0.55 0.59 0.231 1991 1991 None 
Thailand 0.61 0.56 0.112 1987 1988 1998 
Turkey 0.97 0.96 0.018 1989 1989 None 
South Africa 1.01 1.01 0.007 1996 1992 None 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the measures of cost of capital and control variables. The sample 
comprises a maximum of 8,474 firm-year observations representing 23 emerging market countries over the 1996 
to 2006 period. rGLS is the implied cost of equity capital derived based on the Gebhardt et al. (2001) model. rCT is 
the implied cost of equity capital derived based on the Claus and Thomas (2001) model. rOJN is the implied cost 
of equity capital derived based on the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model. rMPEG is the implied cost of 
equity capital derived based on the Easton (2004) model. COC is the average cost of capital estimate implied by 
the four models. INFLATION is the rate of inflation in the firm’s home country. BIDASK represents the annual 
average of the monthly median bid-ask spreads in equity prices. SIZE is the firm’s total book value of assets 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. RETVAR is the stock return variability measured as the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns over the last 12 months. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  FBIAS 
equals the one year ahead IBES analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year minus actual earnings) 
scaled by lagged total assets.  
 
 
  N Mean Median 25th Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Std. Dev 
       
rGLS 8474 0.120 0.111 0.078 0.151 0.064 
rCT 8474 0.149 0.130 0.101 0.172 0.081 
rOJN 8474 0.168 0.152 0.122 0.194 0.075 
rMPEG 8474 0.162 0.145 0.111 0.190 0.085 
COC 8474 0.155 0.136 0.111 0.173 0.059 
       
BIDASK 5694 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.018 
       
INFLATION 8474 0.038 0.036 0.020 0.053 0.023 
SIZE (US$ MN) 8474 3412 509 183 1822 9128 
RETVAR 8474 0.114 0.101 0.071 0.142 0.060 
LEVERAGE 8474 0.514 0.509 0.358 0.654 0.220 
FBIAS 8474 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
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Table 3: Equity Market Liberalization and the Pricing of Information Asymmetry  
This table presents evidence on the effect of equity market liberalization on cost of capital. The sample comprises 
23 emerging market countries for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent variable COC is the mean of four 
estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see Appendix). POST-LIBERALIZATION is a dummy that takes 
a value one starting the year a country experiences a change in the restrictions on foreign ownership that is in the 
top tercile of changes across all country-year changes and zero otherwise. The results in column (1) are for the 
full sample while in column (2) the results are for a subsample of firms that have non-missing values for BIDASK. 
All other variables are defined in Table 2. Specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects and 
country fixed effects. Standard errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical significance 
(two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
  Predicted (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Sign COC COC COC 
        
POST-LIBERALIZATION - -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.00417** 
  (-2.965) (-3.811) (-2.170) 
BIDASK +   0.413*** 
    (3.450) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -   -0.312*** 
    (-2.874) 
INFLATION + 0.248** 0.205* 0.215** 
  (2.732) (1.935) (2.119) 
LOGSIZE - -0.006*** -0.00692*** -0.00634*** 
  (-3.422) (-3.779) (-4.083) 
RETVAR + 0.102*** 0.0756*** 0.0747*** 
  (4.101) (4.286) (4.278) 
LEVERAGE + 0.0469*** 0.0487*** 0.0480*** 
  (6.418) (6.011) (6.170) 
FBIAS + 1.873** 1.487* 1.495** 
  (2.326) (2.080) (2.095) 
Hypothesis testing:     
BIDASK+BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION Difference   0.101* 
 t-stat   (1.797) 
     
Observations  8,474 5,694 5,694 
R-squared  0.296 0.327 0.334 
Country Fixed Effects  Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects   Included Included Included 
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Table 4: Timing of Changes in Cost of Capital 
This table presents evidence on the timing of the cost of capital changes around liberalization shocks. POST-
LIBERALIZATION (-2) and POST-LIBERALIZATION (-1) are dummy variables that take a value one in the period 
two-year prior and one-year prior to year of liberalization announcement and zero otherwise. POST-
LIBERALIZATION (0), POST-LIBERALIZATION (1), POST-LIBERALIZATION (2), and POST-
LIBERALIZATION (3) are dummy variables that take a value one in the year of, one-year after, two-year after, 
and three-year after a country experiences a liberalization shock. POST-LIBERALIZATION (>4) is a dummy that 
takes a value one if a country has experienced a liberalization shock four or more years ago. All other variables 
have been defined in the caption of Table 2. Specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects as well 
as country fixed effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Timing of Changes of Baseline Result 
 
 Predicted COC 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient t-stat 
    
POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) n/a -0.003 (-0.371) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(-1) n/a -0.005 (-0.720) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(0) - -0.010** (-2.317) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(+1) - -0.006* (-1.922) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION (+2) - -0.012*** (-2.910) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(+3) - -0.013*** (-4.696) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(>4) - -0.009*** (-3.190) 
    
Controls  Included 
Country Fixed Effects  Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects  Included 
 
Panel B: Timing of Changes of Pricing of Information Asymmetry  
 
VARIABLES Predicted COC 
 Sign Coefficient t-stat 
    
 
 
BIDASK + 0.418*** (3.327) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) n/a -0.195 (-0.638) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(-1) n/a -0.109 (-0.258) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(0) - -0.376** (-2.678) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(+1) - -0.337* (-1.900) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION (+2) - -0.388* (-2.019) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(+3) - -0.585** (-2.810) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION(>4) - -0.311** (-2.395) 
    
Main effects and Controls  Included 
Country Fixed Effects  Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects   Included 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
This table presents evidence on the robustness of the findings to research design choices. All variables have 
been defined in the captions of Tables 2 and 3 and in Section 4.3. Standard Errors have been obtained by 
clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Robustness to Alternative Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES COC COC COC 
    
POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.00284 -0.00308 0.00581 
 (-0.957) (-1.041) (0.466) 
BIDASK 0.398*** 0.406*** 0.316*** 
 (3.229) (3.501) (4.776) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.312** -0.320*** -0.340*** 
 (-2.427) (-2.874) (-2.946) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included No 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included No 
Industry Fixed Effects No Included No 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects No No Included 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Included 
 
 
 
Panel B: Robustness to alternative measurements of BIDASK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
BIDASK 
QUARTIILE 
BIDASK 
MEDIAN 
BIDASK 
QUINTILE 
BIDASK 
DECILE 
RESIDUAL 
LOG_BIDASK  
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC COC 
      
POST-LIBERALIZATION 0.005* 0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.003*** 
 (1.796) (0.700) (1.710) (1.303) (-5.044) 
BIDASK 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.182*** 
 (5.577) (3.064) (5.897) (5.949) (3.057) 
BIDASK* 
POST-LIBERALIZATION 
-0.006*** -0.007** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.121** 
(-4.507) (-2.507) (-4.513) (-4.307) (-2.133) 
      
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table 5 (Contd.) 
 
Panel C: Robustness to alternative measurement of liberalization shock 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
QUINTILE 
SCHOCK 
MEDIAN 
SHOCK 
2*MEDIAN 
SHOCK 
DECILERANK 
SHOCK 
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC 
     
POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.667) (-0.096) (0.107) (0.320) 
BIDASK 0.355** 0.429*** 0.396*** 0.524*** 
 (2.665) (4.274) (3.256) (5.900) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.258** -0.323*** -0.283** -0.051*** 
 (-2.457) (-2.913) (-2.323) (-4.045) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
 
 
Panel D: Robustness to individual cost of capital estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES rGLS rCT rOJN rMPEG 
          
POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.002 -0.005** -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.560) (-2.321) (-1.379) (-1.092) 
BIDASK 0.465*** 0.358*** 0.453*** 0.533*** 
 (3.911) (3.261) (3.755) (3.136) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.280** -0.254** -0.311*** -0.334** 
 (-2.449) (-2.435) (-2.948) (-2.374) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
 
 
Panel E: Robustness to the use of risk premium measure and long-run growth assumptions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Risk-Premium Alt_COC1 Alt_COC2 
        
POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.004** -0.007*** -0.006** 
 (-2.214) (-3.390) (-2.281) 
BIDASK 0.413*** 0.393*** 0.421*** 
 (3.460) (2.863) (3.461) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.311*** -0.226* -0.273** 
 (-2.875) (-1.756) (-2.518) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
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Table 6: Placebo Tests and within Country Identification 
The sample comprises 23 emerging market countries for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent variable COC is the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity 
capital (see the Appendix). Columns (1) through (4) present results from employing placebo shocks. POST-SHOCK is a dummy variable based on changes in the binary 
measures related to the opening up of these alternative financial markets as provided by Schindler (2009) and Fernández et al. (2015). Columns (5) and (6) present results of a 
within-country analysis of subsample for firms with and without ADRs. In Columns (5) and (6) POST-SHOCK represents the POST-LIBERALIZATION dummy. All control 
variables are defined in Table 2. All specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects as well as country fixed effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by 
clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Money Market Shock Bond Market Shock Derivative Market Shock Government Securities Shock 
Non-ADR 
Sample ADR Sample 
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC COC COC 
             
POST-SHOCK -0.012*** -0.005 -0.006 0.003 -0.005** -0.004 
 (-3.793) (-1.630) (-1.717) (0.401) (-2.255) (-0.533) 
BIDASK 0.252* 0.300** 0.267** 0.295*** 0.446*** 0.241*** 
 (2.002) (2.116) (2.126) (3.448) (2.878) (3.138) 
BIDASK*POST-SHOCK 0.284 -0.0590 -0.0193 -0.043 -0.367** 0.185 
 (0.821) (-0.692) (-0.113) (-0.224) (-2.480) (1.184) 
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 5,694 5,694 5,694 5,694 4,820 874 
R-squared 0.332 0.332 0.331 0.330 0.340 0.432 
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Table 7: Country Characteristics and the Effect of Equity Market Liberalization on the Pricing of Information Asymmetry 
This table presents the effect of country characteristics on the relation between liberalization and the pricing of information asymmetry. Country characteristics include variables 
related to the degree of investor protection, institutional environment and political risk. The sample comprises 23 emerging market countries for the period 1996 to 2006. The 
dependent variable in all the models is COC, which is the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see the Appendix). The regressions include the same 
control variables as in Table 3 and not reported for brevity. All variables have been defined in the caption of Table 2. All specifications include industry-year interactive fixed 
effects as well as country fixed effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
  High Low 
Model Country Characteristics BIDASK POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK BIDASK POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK 
      
1) Securities Regulation 0.259 -0.0903 0.436** -0.384** 
  (1.881) (-0.144) (3.093) (-2.725) 
      
2) Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws 0.190 -0.165 0.474*** -0.270** 
  (0.997) (-0.743) (4.976) (-2.626) 
      
3) Investor Protection 0.161* 0.0703 0.461*** -0.399*** 
  (3.393) (0.115) (3.557) (-3.943) 
      
4) Insider Ownership 0.465** -0.392* 0.281** -0.152 
  (2.733) (-2.380) (2.678) (-1.036) 
      
5) Legal Origin 0.335* -0.255 0.465** -0.407** 
 (High=Common Law; Low=Civil Law) (2.208) (-1.362) (2.495) (-2.897) 
      
6) Accountability of Institutions 0.376* -0.269 0.376*** -0.291** 
  (2.595) (-1.809) (3.977) (-2.589) 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNET APPENDIX  
 
 
 
  
2 
 
The following Appendix provides additional results that supplement the analysis in “Foreign 
Competition for Shares and the Pricing of Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Equity Market 
Liberalization”  
 
This Appendix is in three sections. The first section provides some validation tests of the 
liberalization measure we employ. In the second section, we examine alternative liberalization 
measures. Additional robustness checks are provided in the last section. 
I. Validation tests of the liberalization measure using foreign ownership data  
 
As discussed in Subsection 2.1 of the paper, a potential concern with employing the 
liberalization shock is that removal of explicit regulatory barriers to foreign ownership may not 
result in increased competition for firms’ shares if foreign investors continue to face significant 
implicit barriers due to poor local institutional infrastructure. For example, foreign investors may 
not be willing to invest in stocks in emerging markets if they are concerned about poor investor 
protection and corporate governance in these countries. Prior studies, however, provide strong 
evidence that removal of regulatory barriers is associated with a significant increase in foreign 
capital flows, market valuations, investments, and growth (e.g., Bae et al., 2004; Bae and Goyal, 
2010; Bekaert, 1995; De Jong and De Roon, 2005; Edison and Warnock, 2003; Henry, 2000; Mitton, 
2006). It would be difficult to explain these findings in prior work if the liberalization shocks did 
not result in significant increase in risk-bearing capacity from foreign investors. Still, we present 
some analysis below on how the foreign ownership changes around liberalization. 
We obtain data on foreign ownership from FactSet. FactSet data are only available from 2000, 
which falls after the bulk of the major liberalization steps were taken in the vast majority of the 
sample countries. Thus, this analysis is significantly constrained by the availability of ownership 
data. Out of a total 13 shocks used in our main analysis, only 3 occur in our sample period from 
2000 onwards (i.e., years 2000 to 2006). This significantly limits the extent to which we can provide 
a statistical analysis of comparison of firm-level foreign ownership pre- and post-liberalization 
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shocks. Given this limitation, the purpose of this analysis is not to provide causal evidence but 
rather to provide some descriptive evidence on the construct validity of our liberalization measure.  
First, we examine how the aggregate dollar investment levels by foreign investors in a given 
country vary with liberalization. Changes in aggregate ownership better approximates the notion of 
changes in risk-bearing capacity in a given stock market. Results presented in column (1) of Table 
A.I. Panel A suggest that an increase in liberalization is associated with an increase in investments 
by foreign investors. We next examine the effect of including country- and time-specific effects. 
Given the constraints in data availability, a significant portion of the variation in foreign ownership 
restrictions after 2000 would be cross-sectional in nature, which would be absorbed by inclusion of 
country fixed effects. In the presence of country fixed effects, therefore, we would primarily capture 
the effects of small changes in liberalization, which may not be representative of the effects of the 
key liberalization changes we exploit in our main analysis. Similarly, because of the limited data 
pre- and post-liberalization in this analysis, inclusion of time dummies can soak the effect of 
liberalization shocks. Nevertheless, we present results after the inclusion of country and year fixed 
effects. Results presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table A.I. Panel A suggest that our findings 
continue to hold. 
Next, we examine firm-level holdings. Table A.I. Panel B presents the results of a OLS 
regression of firm-level holdings on LIBERALIZATION. Across specifications, we find that an 
increase in liberalization is associated with an increase in firm-level equity holdings by foreign 
investors. We also examine changes in the foreign investor ownership around the top tercile 
liberalization shocks that we use in our main analysis of the price of information asymmetry. We 
are able to provide only descriptive evidence using this approach because only 3 of the total 13 top 
tercile liberalization shocks used in our main analysis occur from 2000 onwards (i.e., years 2000 to 
2006). We find that firm-level ownership on average is 1% in the three years prior to a shock, rising 
to 2% in the year of shock, to 3% in the year following the shock, and to 4% three years subsequent 
to the shock. 
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Although the above results on firm-level ownership provide a useful construct validity test, the 
interpretation of the findings and economic magnitudes requires significant care. The key 
interpretational issue is that the changes in the actual ownership levels around the liberalization 
shocks do not capture increases in risk-bearing capacity, which is the underlying construct of 
interest in our study. Even if some foreign investors do not hold the stock, the fact that after removal 
of regulatory restrictions these investors have the ability to step in to purchase shares if the price of 
risk were to fall sufficiently low allows these investors to affect share prices.  
Therefore, while the above results suggest that actual ownership levels increases by 3%, it is 
important to keep in mind that on average a top tercile liberalization shock in our sample increases 
the limit on foreign ownership by a much larger fraction of 15%, suggesting that the effect of 
competition from foreign investors waiting on the sidelines is likely to be quite large. We believe 
it is because of this reason that even with these levels of actual foreign ownership prior work has 
found the effects of liberalizations on market valuations, cost of capital, and growth to be quite 
large (e.g., Bekaert et al., 2005; Chari and Henri, 2004; De Jong and De Roon, 2005; Henry, 2000).  
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Table A.I: Validation of the liberalization measure using foreign institutional holdings 
data 
 
This table presents least squares regressions of foreign institutional ownership on liberalization. The dependent 
variable is a measure of foreign equity characteristic. In Panel A, IO_Foreign_Value is the aggregate dollar value 
of shares held by foreign institutions in a country. The data on Foreign and US Institutional Holdings is obtained 
from Thomson Reuter’s FactSet database and is based on Ferrera and Matos (2008). This measure is available 
from 2000 to 2006. In Panel B, IO_Foreign_Pct is the firm-level foreign institutional ownership and is calculated 
as the fraction of outstanding shares of a firm held by institutions from FactSet database. This measure is available 
from 2000 to 2006. LIBERALIZATION is the measure of the intensity of restrictions on foreign ownership in a 
country’s stock market as defined in Edison and Warnock (2003). Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Value of foreign institutional ownership holdings 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IO_Foreign_Value IO_Foreign_Value IO_Foreign_Value 
        
LIBERALIZATION 2.515** 3.077** 2.140* 
 (2.578) (2.310) (1.768) 
    
Observations 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.105 0.768 0.268 
Fixed Effects None Country Year 
 
 
Panel B: Firm-level foreign institutional ownership 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IO_Foreign_Pct IO_Foreign_Pct IO_Foreign_Pct 
     
LIBERALIZATION 0.0274** 0.0312** 0.0239** 
 (2.660) (4.896) (2.124) 
    
Observations 18,204 18,204 18,204 
R-squared 0.023 0.126 0.030 
Fixed Effects None Country Year 
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II. Alternative measures of liberalization 
  
 
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our inferences to the use of two alternative measures 
that, like the Edison and Warnock (2003) measure, are also explicitly based on regulations. 
 
There are two key alternative rule-based measures of equity market openness that have been used: 
the Chinn-Ito index and the Schindler (2009) measure, both of which are constructed based on 
information in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). The AREAER is the primary source of the rules and regulations that countries use to 
govern capital transactions, as well as the proceeds arising from them, between residents and non-
residents.  
 
The Chinn-Ito index [introduced in Chinn and Ito (2006)] is based on four binary dummy variables 
that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the 
AREAERs. Specifically, the four dummy variables relate to: (1) the openness of a country's capital 
account, (2) the openness of the current account, (3) the stringency of requirements for the 
repatriation and/or surrender of export proceeds, and (4) the existence of multiple exchange rates 
for capital account transaction. Chinn-Ito index take the principal component of these four binary 
indicators that were reported in the AREAER. A major drawback of this measure is that it is unclear 
to what extent these indicators are measures of equity market openness in a narrow sense, given 
that three of the four indices underlying these indicators represent information that is not directly 
related to capital account transactions. Furthermore, the binary measure related to capital account 
openness encompasses all types of assets including equity, bonds, real estates, derivatives and 
government securities and not just equity. Thus, this measure is a crude approximation of equity 
market liberalization.  
 
Schindler (2009) [subsequently expanded by Fernández et al. (2015) and Klein (2012)] builds a 
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measure of liberalization based on the de jure information from the AREAER as well. The key 
difference between the Schindler (2009) measure and the Chinn-Ito measure is the level of 
granularity. In particular, as mentioned above, the Chinn-Ito index codes capital account 
liberalization as a binary outcome variable based on the authors’ read of the country’s capital 
market regulations as a whole and is not asset-type specific. In contrast, the Schindler (2009) index 
is disaggregated both by whether the controls are on inflows or outflows, and by different categories 
of assets, such as equities and bonds. Thus, Schindler (2009) allows for a more detailed analysis of 
capital controls. For each granular category, Schindler (2009) provides a binary outcome variable 
based on the authors’ assessment of the regulatory restrictions. 
   
The key issue with both of these measures is that they ignore rich variation in the liberalization 
process by coding the measures as an “all-or-nothing” variable. As a result, these measures do not 
capture all shocks and reduce the statistical power of tests especially in the sample period post-
1995. For example, as per these measures, India did not experience any liberalization shock during 
our sample period. However, as per the Edison and Warnock (2003) measure, India experienced a 
liberalization shock in 2002. As per the Reserve Bank of India’s 2002 Annual Report, India indeed 
relaxed restrictions on foreign ownership during this year.21 Based on the Chinn and Ito (2006) and 
Schindler (2009) measures, we are able to identify only 6 and 9 shocks (respectively) compared to 
13 shocks identified by the Edison and Warnock measure. 
 
Nevertheless, we explore the robustness of our inferences to use of the alternative measures. Similar 
to our main analyses, we identify the first year when the restrictions are relaxed in our sample year 
and examine the pricing of information asymmetry subsequent to these shocks. Specifically, for the 
Chinn-Ito index, which is a continuous measure representing the principal component of the four 
binary measures as discussed above, we follow an approach similar to our main analysis and 
                                                          
21 See the section on Development and Regulation of Financial Markets in the Reserve Bank of India’s 2002 
Annual Report. 
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identify a top tercile shock within our sample period. Since Schindler (2009) provides granular 
binary variables, we identify the liberalization shock based on the first year in our sample period 
when the binary variable corresponding to equity purchase restrictions by nonresidents switches 
from restricted (one) to unrestricted (zero).  
 
Panel A of Table A.II presents the results for Schindler (2009) measure and Panel B presents the 
results for Chinn and Ito measure. We find that liberalization reduces the price of information 
asymmetry in 8 out of 10 specifications.  
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Table A.II: Equity Market Liberalization and the Pricing of Information Asymmetry –
Alternative Measures of Equity Market Liberalization 
This table presents evidence on the effect of equity market liberalization on the pricing of information asymmetry. 
The sample comprises 23 emerging market countries for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent variable COC is 
the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see the Appendix of the paper). Panel A presents 
results for analyses based on the Schindler (2009) and Fernandez et al. (2015) measure of liberalization while 
Panel B presents evidence from analyses based on Chinn-Ito (2006) measure of liberalization. For the Chinn-Ito 
index which is a continuous measure, we follow an approach similar to our main analysis and identify a top tercile 
shock within our sample period. Since Schindler (2009) provides granular binary variables, we identify the 
liberalization shock based on the first year in our sample period when the binary variable corresponding to equity 
purchase restrictions by nonresidents switches from restricted (one) to unrestricted (zero). BIDASK represents the 
annual average of the monthly median bid-ask spreads in equity prices. In Columns (1) through (5) of both panels, 
BIDASK represents the continuous, quartile, median, quintile and decile measure of the annual average of the 
monthly median bid-ask spreads in equity prices respectively. All control variables have been defined in the 
caption of Table 2. All specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects as well as country fixed effects. 
Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Panel A: Schindler (2009) measure related to purchase of equity by foreigners 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BIDASK CONT BIDASK QUARTILE BIDASK MEDIAN BIDASK QUINTILE BIDASK DECILE 
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC COC 
            
POST-Schindler-SHOCK -0.0117*** -0.002 0.000809 -0.00213 -0.00323 
 (-3.799) (-0.615) (0.195) (-0.560) (-0.861) 
BIDASK 0.311** 0.006*** 0.0116*** 0.00526*** 0.00261*** 
 (2.484) (4.927) (4.972) (5.057) (5.345) 
BIDASK*POST-Schindler-SHOCK -0.006 -0.004*** -0.00832*** -0.00324*** -0.00157*** 
 (-0.069) (-3.129) (-4.069) (-3.359) (-3.418) 
INFLATION 0.240** 0.249** 0.241** 0.251** 0.252** 
 (2.245) (2.390) (2.285) (2.410) (2.416) 
LOGSIZE -0.00628*** -0.00553*** -0.00594*** -0.00544*** -0.00542*** 
 (-3.848) (-3.242) (-3.448) (-3.187) (-3.185) 
RETVAR 0.0726*** 0.0749*** 0.0744*** 0.0744*** 0.0740*** 
 (3.651) (3.807) (3.737) (3.736) (3.728) 
LEVERAGE 0.0535*** 0.0519*** 0.0523*** 0.0516*** 0.0517*** 
 (8.401) (8.427) (8.329) (8.442) (8.562) 
FBIAS 1.526** 1.556** 1.564** 1.565** 1.562** 
 (2.364) (2.362) (2.376) (2.392) (2.389) 
      
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 5,794 5,794 5,794 5,794 5,794 
R-squared 0.376 0.379 0.376 0.380 0.380 
 
  
11 
 
Panel B: Chinn-Ito (2006) Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 BIDASK CONT BIDASK QUARTILE BIDASK MEDIAN BIDASK QUINTILE BIDASK DECILE 
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC COC 
            
POST-Ito-Chinn-SHOCK -0.00811 0.00657 0.00865 0.00463 0.00324 
 (-1.369) (0.969) (1.089) (0.729) (0.544) 
BIDASK 0.298** 0.00544*** 0.00954*** 0.00439*** 0.00219*** 
 (2.374) (4.464) (3.961) (4.571) (4.848) 
BIDASK*Post-Ito-Chinn-Shock 0.0919 -0.00609** -0.0115** -0.00434** -0.00212** 
 (0.279) (-2.718) (-2.391) (-2.671) (-2.679) 
INFLATION 0.239** 0.250** 0.241** 0.252** 0.253** 
 (2.214) (2.365) (2.257) (2.361) (2.374) 
LOGSIZE -0.00744*** -0.00663*** -0.00702*** -0.00654*** -0.00652*** 
 (-4.825) (-4.022) (-4.237) (-3.944) (-3.945) 
RETVAR 0.0750*** 0.0762*** 0.0764*** 0.0758*** 0.0753*** 
 (3.762) (3.880) (3.823) (3.826) (3.813) 
LEVERAGE 0.0553*** 0.0534*** 0.0538*** 0.0532*** 0.0533*** 
 (8.232) (8.367) (8.218) (8.330) (8.452) 
FBIAS 1.572** 1.621** 1.624** 1.631** 1.634** 
 (2.439) (2.448) (2.466) (2.467) (2.470) 
      
Country Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 5,794 5,794 5,794 5,794 5,794 
R-squared 0.371 0.374 0.371 0.374 0.374 
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III. Additional Robustness Analysis 
In this section, we provide findings from: 
(i) A falsification test based on Altonji et al. (2005) (Table A.III.)  
(ii) A test of differential effect on regulated industries (Table A.IV.) 
(iii) A sensitivity test of our results to the use of unsmooth liberalization measure (Table 
A.V.). 
(iv) Extended pre-periods for tests of parallel trends (Table A.VI.) 
 
(i) Altonji et al. (2005) based falsification tests 
We conduct falsification tests in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) to gauge the extent to 
which concurrent local growth/economic shocks could be driving our results. This strategy has 
been employed in recent studies such as Christensen et al. (2016) and Christensen et al. (2017) to 
rule out concurrent confounds. Specifically, under this approach, we first regress our implied cost 
of capital measures on a set of three proxies based on prior work (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) 
that are expected to be strongly correlated with local growth/economic shocks: GDP growth, stock 
market valuation as a fraction of GDP, and trade as a percentage of GDP. We use this first-stage 
regression to create a predicted value for implied cost of capital based on these variables. We use 
the predicted value as the dependent variable in our main DiD specification used to measure the 
effect of liberalization on the cost of capital. If our main results are driven by local growth/other 
economic shocks, we would expect the coefficient on BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION to be 
similar to what we find in our main tests. The results in Table A.III. show that the coefficient on 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION is statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero. 
This suggests that our main specifications are effective at absorbing the confounding effect of 
concurrent growth/other economic shocks. 
  
13 
 
Table A.III: Assessing Identification Assumptions – Altonji et al. (2005)-based test 
 
This table provides a falsification test in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). In untabulated first stage, we regress 
our implied cost of capital measures on a set of three proxies that are expected to be correlated with local 
growth/economic shocks: (i) GDP growth, (ii) stock market valuation as a fraction of GDP, and (iii) trade as a 
percentage of GDP. We use this first-stage regression to create a predicted value for implied cost of capital based 
on these variables (Predicted COC). We use the predicted value as the dependent variable in our main 
specification. Table presents the results of this second-stage regression. All variables have been defined in the 
caption of Table 4. All specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects as well as country fixed 
effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
  (1) 
 
Altonji et al. (2005) 
test 
VARIABLES Predicted COC 
    
POST- LIBERALIZATION -0.001 
 (-1.647) 
BIDASK 0.006 
 (0.928) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION 0.009 
 (1.157) 
INFLATION -0.050** 
 (-2.554) 
LOGSIZE 0.001*** 
 (3.584) 
RETVAR 0.003 
 (1.579) 
LEVERAGE -0.001 
 (-1.462) 
FBIAS -0.110 
 (-1.604) 
  
Country Fixed Effects Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 5,694 
R-squared 0.922 
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(ii) Differential effects on regulated industries 
We next report evidence from a test that exploits within-country variation in estimating the 
effects. Similar to the ADR test in the study, by holding the country constant, this analysis mitigates 
concerns that omitted country-level factors could be driving our results. The analysis is based on 
the observation that most country-level liberalization policies explicitly leave out regulated 
industries (Bekaert et al., 2007). Thus, we expect the effect of liberalization shocks to be muted for 
firms in regulated industries. However, an important empirical issue is in identifying these regulated 
industries. Although academic studies based on U.S. data typically classify banking and utilities as 
regulated industries, there is considerable heterogeneity across countries in the notion of 
“regulated” industries and, hence, in the industries that they choose to liberalize. For example, by 
1998, Korea completely eliminated any restrictions on foreign ownership except for some regulated 
sectors, such as telecommunications, air transportations, and broadcasting. Accordingly, we explore 
two definitions of regulated industries. The first definition of regulated follows the broad 
classification adopted in studies such as Bekaert et al. (2007) and Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and 
includes industries related to utilities, food products, agriculture, tobacco, alcohol, defense, health, 
mining, banking, insurance, and transportation. The second definition of regulated industries 
exclusively focuses on banking and utilities.  
We present the results in Table A.IV. Columns (1) and (2) for the first definition and 
columns (3) and (4) for the second definition of regulated industries, respectively. These columns 
present results of equation (4) separately for subsamples of firms that are in regulated industries 
(REGULATED) and those that are not. We observe that information asymmetry is priced across 
both subsamples (coefficient on BIDASK). However, consistent with expectations, the results show 
that the decline in the pricing of information asymmetry following liberalization (coefficient on 
POST-LIBERALIZATION*BIDASK) is concentrated only in unregulated industries and is 
insignificant in the subsample of regulated industries. We arrive at a similar inference using both 
definitions of regulated industries. 
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Table A.IV: Differential Effects on Regulated Industries 
 
This table presents results of subsample analyses for regulated and unregulated industries. In Columns (1) and (2), 
regulated firms represents firms related to utilities, food products, agriculture, tobacco, alcohol, defense, health, 
mining, banking, insurance and transportation (Bekaert et al., 2007; Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). In Columns (3) 
and (4), regulated firms represents firms related to utilities and banking. All variables have been defined in the 
caption of Table 4. All specifications include country-year interactive fixed effects as well as firm fixed effects. 
Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Unregulated  
Industries 
Regulated 
 Industries 
Unregulated 
Industries 
(Alternative)  
Regulated  
Industries 
(Alternative) 
VARIABLES COC COC COC COC 
      
POST-LIBERALIZATION N/A N/A N/A N/A 
     
BIDASK 0.357** 0.293*** 0.331** 0.158 
 (2.623) (3.341) (2.670) (1.035) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION -0.439*** -0.191 -0.305* -0.207 
 (-3.119) (-0.788) (-2.060) (-1.424) 
LOGSIZE 0.00399 -0.000240 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.933) (-0.0666) (0.784) (-1.141) 
RETVAR 0.0115 -0.0169 0.001 -0.014 
 (0.489) (-0.412) (0.0799) (-0.395) 
LEVERAGE 0.0365* 0.00518 0.0251 0.0457 
 (2.080) (0.246) (1.561) (1.116) 
FBIAS 1.997* 2.271 2.368*** -0.126 
 (2.076) (1.655) (2.883) (-0.407) 
     
Country*Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 3,538 2,156 4,838 856 
R-squared 0.783 0.786 0.775 0.846 
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(iii) Robustness of results to the use of the unsmooth liberalization measure of Edison and 
Warnock (2003) 
In all our analysis, we estimate shocks to liberalization measure based on the measure 
presented in Equation (2). We next examine the sensitivity of our results to using the measure 
presented in Equation (1). Recall that the difference between the two measures is that Equation (1) 
is not smoothened while Equation (2) is adjusted for the effect of asymmetric price shocks by 
scaling the measure in Equation (1) with the relative prices of investable and non-investable stocks. 
Results presented in Table A.V Panel B suggest that our results continue to hold for this alternative 
measure.  
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Table A.V: Using Unsmooth Measure of Restrictions on Foreign Ownership 
This table presents evidence on the effect of equity market liberalization on the pricing of information asymmetry. 
The sample comprises 23 emerging market countries for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent variable COC is 
the mean of four estimates for the implied cost of equity capital (see the Appendix of the paper). POST-
LIBERALIZATION (Unsmooth) is constructed as a dummy variable based on changes in the unsmooth measure of 
the intensity of restrictions on foreign ownership in a country’s stock market as defined in Edison and Warnock 
(2003). Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the unsmooth measure. In Panel B, POST-LIBERALIZATION 
(Unsmooth) is a dummy that takes a value one following the first year a country experiences a change in the 
restrictions of foreign ownership that is in the top tercile of changes across all country-year changes and zero 
otherwise. BIDASK represents the annual average of the monthly median bid-ask spreads in equity prices. All 
other control variables have been defined in the caption of Table 2. Specification includes industry-year interactive 
fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. 
Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Unsmooth EW Measure 5676 0.867 0.951 0.169 
          
 
Panel B: Pricing of Information Asymmetry 
  (1) 
VARIABLES COC 
    
POST-LIBERALIZATION (Unsmooth) -0.00476* 
 (-1.809) 
BIDASK 0.458*** 
 (4.820) 
BIDASK*POST-LIBERALIZATION (Unsmooth) -0.387*** 
 (-4.344) 
INFLATION 0.232** 
 (2.436) 
LOGSIZE -0.006*** 
 (-4.072) 
RETVAR 0.077*** 
 (4.437) 
LEVERAGE 0.048*** 
 (6.328) 
FBIAS 1.515** 
 (2.133) 
  
Observations 5,676 
R-squared 0.338 
Country Fixed Effects Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects Included 
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(iv) Extended pre-periods for tests of parallel trends 
 
Next, we examine pre-trends for two additional years in cost of capital movements (and not 
price of IA) by expanding our sample to include years 1995 and 1994. We are able to do so because 
we do not require bid-ask spread data for this test and only need to obtain implied cost of capital 
and control variables for the additional years. Table A.VI below presents the findings from this 
analysis. It can be seen that the coefficient on all pre-liberalization dummies is not significantly 
different from zero. We, however, strongly recommend caution while interpreting these results 
because of the rather limited IBES coverage of international firms during these years, which allows 
us to obtain implied cost of capital estimates for much fewer firms during these additional years. 
For example, the number of observations in 1994 is about half of those in 1996.  
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Table A.VI: Timing of Changes of Baseline Result – Extended Pre-Period 
This table presents evidence on the timing of the cost of capital changes around liberalization shocks. POST-
LIBERALIZATION (-4), POST-LIBERALIZATION (-3), POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) and POST-
LIBERALIZATION (-1) are dummy variables that take a value one in the period four-year prior, three-year prior, 
two-year prior and one-year prior to year of liberalization announcement and zero otherwise. POST-
LIBERALIZATION (0), POST-LIBERALIZATION (1), POST-LIBERALIZATION (2), and POST-
LIBERALIZATION (3) are dummy variables that take a value one in the year of, one-year after, two-year after, 
and three-year after a country experiences a liberalization shock. POST-LIBERALIZATION (>4) is a dummy that 
takes a value one if a country has experienced a liberalization shock four or more years ago. All other variables 
have been defined in the caption of Table 2. Specifications include industry-year interactive fixed effects as well 
as country fixed effects. Standard Errors have been obtained by clustering at the country level. Statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 Predicted COC 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient t-stat 
    
POST-LIBERALIZATION (-4) n/a -0.005 (-0.170) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION (-3) n/a 0.000 (0.010) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION (-2) n/a -0.003 (-0.371) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(-1) n/a -0.005 (-0.720) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(0) - -0.010** (-2.317) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(+1) - -0.006* (-1.922) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION (+2) - -0.012*** (-2.910) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(+3) - -0.013*** (-4.696) 
POST-LIBERALIZATION(>4) - -0.009*** (-3.190) 
    
Controls  Included 
Country Fixed Effects  Included 
Year*Industry Fixed Effects  Included 
 
 
 
